gence on his part." 36 This doctrine seems to have been very generally accepted and adopted. 37 In Mississippi, the court say pithily : 'Whatever is sufficient to put a party upon inquiry amounts in equity to notice." 3 8 Whether the subsequent purahaser has made due inquiry is a question of fact for the jury; and with a view to its determination, the information obtained by him may be proved, though it can not be used to bear upon the question whether or not there was such a deed.
PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW.
It is to be observed, in the first place, that the courts will take judicial notice of: 1. The law of nations. 4. The ecclesiastical law, for the purpose of determining how far it is a part of the common law." .5. The courts of a State which has been carved out of another State, take judicial notice of the statutes of the latter State, passed prior to the separation.b
In accordance with this principle, the Supreme Court of the United States has taken judicial notice of the Spanish laws prevailing in Lou- isiana before the cession of that territory to this government, and upon which laws titles to land in that State depended. 6 And, in a more recent case, in a circuit court of the United States, the title to lands in Texas being involved, the question having arisen whether the laws of Tamaulipas, in whose limits the premises in question formerly lay, must be proven or could be judicially noticed, it was held by Mr. Justice Bradley, that judicial notice would be taken of them, on the ground that the former laws of a country still affecting its landed estates are to be regarded as domestic and not foreign laws.7 6. All courts take judicial notice of their domestic law.
8
And the common law of a State which had no political existence before the Revolution, is the common law as modified and amended by English statutes passed prior to the Revolution.
9
But it is held that, in those States whose colonies were established before the Revolution, with a power to legislate for themselves, English statutes passed after the colonies were thus established., but prior to the Revolution, are not a part of their common law. 7. The State courts take judicial notice of the Federal Constitution, and of its amendments," as well as of Federal statutes.12 8. The Federal courts take judicial notice of the laws of the several States composing the national government.
13
"It can never be maintained in the courts of the United States," said Mr. Chief-Justice Taney,. "that the laws of any State of this Union are to be treated as the laws of a foreign na- 
30
A distinction is taken between the written and the unwritten law, and, while the latter may be proven by the testimony of experts, the former can only be shown by the production of the written Jaw itself, duly authenticated. The unwritten law may be proven by parol, 31 while-the written law must be produced. 32 In an early case, its proper application. In reference to this distinction between the written and unwritten law as to modes of proof, it is important to observe that the courts have held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the foreign law is unwritten, and that parol evidence will be received upon this assumption.3 4 While the general rule excludes, in this country, the testimony of witnesses as to the written or statutory law, yet such testimony has been received when the question was, not so much as to the language of the written law, but as to what was the law altogether as shown by its exposition, interpretation and adjudication. In admitting such testimony in Alabama as to the law of Louisiana, the court said: "The exposition, interpretation and adjudication may never have been evidenced by books or writings; but may, nevertheless, have become well understood, as the rule of law deduced by the court from the written words of the Code upon a particular state of facts. Upon such a question, the testimony or opinions of competent witnesses, instructed in the law of that State, may be resorted to." 35 In another case it is held that while the statute of a foreign State can not be proved by parol, yet the construction given to such statutes by the tribunals where they are in force, may be given in evidence by witnesses learned in such laws.
36
And the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently permitted a Spaniard, formerly of Havana, to testify that a verbal partnership was valid under the laws of Cuba; that he might state the written law without producing it.
exemplification of the exact words of a foreign statute, which the court may not have the necessary knowledge to construe. And it seems to us that the requiring an exemplified copy is pressing the rule of requiring the best evidence to an extent that would often defeat the ends of justice." Chancellor Kent, in an early case, also permitted a Spanish lawyer to testify that a will was executed according to the laws of Cuba, without the production of the written law.
38
And recently, in Pennsylvania, a witnesss was permitted to testify as to the laws of Baden, though his testimony involved a statute. Denman said: "There is another general rule; that the opinions of persons of science must be received as to the facts of their science. That rule applies to the evidence of legal men, and I think it is not" confined to .unwritten law, but extends also to the written laws which such men are bound to know. Properly speaking, the nature of such evidence is not to set forth the contents of the written law, but its effect and the state of the law resulting from it.
The mere contents, indeed, might often mislead persons not familiar with the particular system of law. The witness is called upon to state what law does result from the evidence."
The same principle is laid down in Earl Nelson v. Lord Bridport, where the court declares that, although thewritten law is produced, and due proof made that it has not been repealed, varied or fallen into disuse, and that the words have been accurately translated, "still the words require due construction, and the construction depends on the meaning of the words to be considered with reference to other words not contained in the mere text of the law, and also with reference to the subject-matter, which is not insulated from all others. The construction may have been, probably has. been, the subject of judicial decision ; instead of one decision, there may have been a long succession of decisions, varying more or less from each other, and ultimately ending in that which alone ought to be applied in the particular case."
As Lord Brougham said in the Sussex Peerage Case," "it is perfectly clear that the proper mode of proving a foreign law is not by showing to the House the book of the law; for the House (of Lords), has not organs to know and to deal with the text of that law, and therefore requires the assistance of a lawyer who knows how to interpret it."
When it is desired to prove the language of the written law by the production of the statute, it is evidently necessary that the statute should be authenticated or verified in some manner. In most of the States provision has been made by statute, and books purporting to contain the laws of a sister State, and to be published by authority of such State, may be received as prima Jacie evidence of the laws of such State. 45 And such books have been received in the absence of any statute authorizing it. One of the earliest reported cases on this subject is that of Thompson v. Musser, 4 6 in which the right to use such a book as evidence of the law was sustained. "I admit," said McKean, C. J., "that this printed copy of an act of assembly, though it purports to have been printed by the law printers of Virginia, is not as good evidence as a sworn copy compared with the rolls or an exemplifleation under the great seal, but these modes of authentication are likewise inferior to the original law itself. If the plaintiff in error had been sued in Virginia, this printed book of the acts of assembly would then, unquestionably, have been good evidence; and I can discover no satisfactory reason why, as he is sued here, the same evidence should not be received at least prima facie" This case was decided in 1789, two years prior to the passage of the act of Congress providing for the authentication of records. 47 But since that act, the same doctrine has been maintained, and in the face of the objection that laws should be authenticated in the manner provided for in that act.
48 And a volume of laws of a foreign government, transmitted by that government to the Supreme Court of the United States, will be admitted as evidence of the laws of such government, in the courts of the United States, without further authentication.
Supreme Court of Indiana, November 29, 1881.
Where a grantor, by an ordinary warranty deed, without conditions or limitations therein expressed, onveys land to certain grantees named in the deed, without using language indicating that they take as rustees, but at the same time executes an agreement with the grantees which shows that they take as trustees, and as such are to sell the land and apply the proceeds to the payment of the grantor's creditors,the transaction must be regarded as a composition agreement between the grantor and his creditors, and not as a voluntary assignment.
2. Where a deed is placed in the hands of a third party, to be delivered only upon condition, and such party, before compliance with said condition, wrongfully delivers the same, the delivery is without force, and passes no title to the grantes in the deed, and the grantor may assail and overthrow it.
3. To constitute a valid estoppel by conduct, there must be knowledge on the part of the party sought to be estopped, and a want of knowledge on the part of the party relying upon the estoppel.
4. An answer which attempts to plead an estoppel by conduct, must show that the defendant relied upon the plaintiff's representations or conduct, was influenced thereby, and was ignorant of the truth. In pleading an estoppel,the facts must be stated with fullness and certainty.
5. No affirmative defense can be maintained upon a deed which has been fraudulently altered Uy the party who made the alteration.
6. But one who purchases in good faith from such grantee, without knowledge of the alteration of the deed, and acting upon representations of the grantor in the altered deed, obtains a good title. ELLIOTT, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court:
This action was commenced by the appellants in the Decatur Circuit Court, and the venue afterwards changed to the Rush Circuit Court.
The complaint of the appellants was in four paragraphs. In the first paragraph it was alleged, that the appellant was the owner of certain real estate on the 17th of December, 1871, and of a large amount of personal property; that, on that day, he executed a deed of assignment to Ralph Magee for said real estate, for the benefit of his, appellant's, creditors; that, at the same time, a written agreement was executed by appellant and the appellees; that at the time of said assignment, the appellant was in failing circumstances, and largely indebted to other persons, not parties to the aforesaid agreement, nor included within the list of creditors in the said assignment, and that the said assignment was made under the act concerning voluntary assignments, approved March 5th, 1859. Copies of the deed of assignment and of the agreement executed contemporaneously with it, are set forth. It is charged that the assignment was invalid for the following reasons: It was not made for the benefit of all of the creditors of the assignor; it was not accompanied by a schedule containing a particular enumeration of all the personal property assigned; the schedule was not sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, as required by the act aforesaid; that the deed was not properly acknowledged; that the deed was not recorded accordinig to law, and that the trustees did not take the oath required by statute. The second paragraph alleges, in substance, that the deed of assignment was delivered as an escrow to one Scobey, to be
